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Abstract Social storage systems are a good alternative to existing data backup sys-
tems of local, centralized, and P2P backup. Till date, researchers have mostly fo-
cussed on either building such systems by using existing underlying social networks
(exogenously built) or on studying Quality of Service (QoS) related issues. In this pa-
per, we look at two untouched aspects of social storage systems. One aspect involves
modelling social storage as an endogenous social network, where agents themselves
decide with whom they want to build data backup relation, which is more intuitive
than exogenous social networks. The second aspect involves studying the stability of
social storage systems, which would help reduce maintenance costs and further, help
build efficient as well as contented networks.
We have a four fold contribution that covers the above two aspects. We, first,
model the social storage system as a strategic network formation game. We define
the utility of each agent in the network under two different frameworks, one where
the cost to add and maintain links is considered in the utility function and the other
where budget constraints are considered. In the context of social storage and social
cloud computing, these utility functions are the first of its kind, and we use them to
define and analyse the social storage network game. Second, we propose the concept
of bilateral stability which refines the pairwise stability concept defined by Jackson
and Wolinsky (1996), by requiring mutual consent for both addition and deletion of
links, as compared to mutual consent just for link addition. Mutual consent for link
deletion is especially important in the social storage setting. The notion of bilateral
stability subsumes the bilateral equilibrium definition of Goyal and Vega-Redondo
(2007). Third, we prove necessary and the sufficient conditions for bilateral stability
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of social storage networks. For symmetric social storage networks, we prove that
there exists a unique neighborhood size, independent of the number of agents (for all
non-trivial cases), where no pair of agents has any incentive to increase or decrease
their neighborhood size. We call this neighborhood size as the stability point. Fourth,
given the number of agents and other parameters, we discuss which bilaterally stable
networks would evolve and also discuss which of these stable networks are efficient
— that is, stable networks with maximum sum of utilities of all agents. We also
discuss ways to build contented networks, where each agent achieves the maximum
possible utility.
Keywords Social Storage, Endogenous Network Formation, Bilateral Stability,
Pairwise Stability, F2F Backup System, Peer-to-Peer System
1 Introduction
In this digital era, where personal data size is growing exponentially, data backup
is not a new need. Data stored on an agent’s local machine is prone to loss due
to disk-failure, malware, and so on. Local backup, centralised on-line backup (for
example, Backblaze1, CrashPlan2) and decentralised (Peer-to-Peer) backup (for ex-
ample, Pstore (Batten et al, 2002), Pastiche (Cox et al, 2002), Samsara (Cox and
Noble, 2003), etc.) are some strategies available to agents. Each has its own merits
and demerits. For example, maintaining data backup on a local external hard disk on a
regular basis is cumbersome. As far as on-line backup systems are concerned, on the
one hand, centralised on-line backup is not cost efficient, especially when the amount
of data required to be backed up is huge. On the other hand, although Peer-to-Peer
(P2P) backup systems are cost efficient, they require dealing with several issues like
data availability, reliability and security (Steinmetz and Wehrle, 2005).
In recent years, to cope up with the above issues in P2P storage systems, re-
searchers have been focusing on social network relationships. It is believed that social
ties between agents will help to build backup systems that overcome aforementioned
issues. This trend that takes real world social relationships into account for construct-
ing a data backup system is emerging as Social Storage or Friend-to-Friend (F2F)
Storage (Friendstore (Tran et al, 2008), FriendBox (Moreno-Martı´nez et al, 2012),
BackupBuddy3 are a few examples).
Existing research on social storage is moving in two directions. One research
trend (Li and Dabek, 2006; Nguyen and Li, 2007; Tran et al, 2012; Gracia-Tinedo
et al, 2012b,c; Moreno-Martı´nez et al, 2012) has been focusing on various technical
approaches to build the system, for example, data backup techniques. The other direc-
tion (Oliveira et al, 2008; Sharma et al, 2011; Gracia-Tinedo et al, 2012a; Blackburn
et al, 2014) has been focusing on studying Quality of Service (QoS) related issues.
This includes data availability, reliability, the cost associated with communication,
data maintenance, data placement or scheduling polices, by taking online social rela-
tionships into account.
1https://secure.backblaze.com/buy.htm (Visited on 09 May 2017)
2https://store.crashplan.com/store/ (Visited on 09 May 2017)
3http://www.buddybackup.com/ (Visited on 09 May 2017)
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1.1 Social Storage Issues Addressed in this Paper
In this work, we address two other issues of social storage. First, major social storage
studies (such as Gracia-Tinedo et al (2012a,c); Blackburn et al (2014)) have con-
sidered exogenous social networks (an underlying social network, for instance Face-
book, Orkut, Venus, etc.) to construct a social storage system and to study QoS related
issues4. However, the approach of considering an exogenous social network to build
a social storage system (or to do QoS analysis) fails to address various aspects.
Here, there is an assumption that an agent in the underlying network is involved
in data backup activity with all its neighbors. However, it is possible that agents do
not want to perform a data backup activity with their set of existing neighbors. In
other words, the approach does not focus on participation benefits and costs. Rational
(self-interested) behavior of agents involved in the data backup activity is not taken
into consideration5.
The QoS analysis, which is based upon the neighborhood size in the underlying
network, is no longer valid. Thus, it is important to study when agents want to perform
a data backup activity and/ or when they do not. Hence, in this paper, we model the
social storage system as an endogenous network formation game.
Second, social storage systems may not be stable (when agents have no incentive
to add new partners or delete existing partners). Even if stable, they may not be effi-
cient (maximizing the sum of utilities of all agents), and even if efficient, they may
not be contended (when all agents achieve their maximum utility).
There is limited study on stability, efficiency, and contentment of social storage
systems. While proposing the idea of F2F backup systems, Li and Dabek (2006) ar-
gue that social ties between agents act as incentives for them to stay in the system,
thereby resulting in a stable social storage system. In their context, a system is unsta-
ble when agents arrive and depart the social storage system randomly — lesser this
randomness, more the stability of the system. In our case, a social storage system, as
above, is stable when agents have no incentive to add new partners or delete exist-
ing partners. In the following subsections, we motivate this definition of stability in
detail.
Studying social storage systems as an endogenous network formation game, and
then analyzing its stability may, on first glance, seem contradictory — since one can-
not do anything from outside the (endogenous) system if the agents’ themselves do
not form a stable network. In our case, agents always form a stable network, but the
network may not be efficient. That is, the sum of the utilities of all agents may not be
the maximum possible. In our case, as many agents as possible may not be contented
as well, i.e. all agents achieve maximum possible utility. Contented networks are also
efficient.
Looking at both endogenous network formation and efficiency and contentment
is useful because, though the social storage system is built endogenously, an inde-
4This is because social storage is in its infancy and an architectural prototype of social storage is in
the development stage.
5Although Sharma et al (2011) begin discussing about agents’ strategic behavior in a scenario where
limited storage is available for the agents, this has just been touched upon and has not been looked at in
detail.
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pendent observer (say, an administrator or a regulator) can check whether the system
is efficient and contented, and if not, can externally do a small perturbation to the
network. In some scenarios we look at, the independent administrator may achieve
efficiency and/ or contentment by just introducing a small number of dummy agents.
1.2 Our Model
Both aspects of social storage systems that we address in this paper (that is, endoge-
nously evolved systems as well as stability, efficiency and contentment of such sys-
tems) are easily analysed by using strategic network formation models. Modelling
a utility function (the payoff that each agent receives in a network) is the foremost
requirement to study network formation in a strategic setting (Jackson, 2008). This
aspect has not been given much attention by researchers working in the social storage
domain.
In the strategic network formation literature, specifically endogenous network for-
mation game, different kinds of utility functions have been proposed and successfully
validated. We summarise some of these utility functions in the next section. Utility
modelling is more crucial in the social storage context, where decision makers are
human agents who aim to optimise their own goals. This is in comparison to the P2P
storage context (our closest cousin), where nodes (computer systems) are decision
makers. Here, agents do not want to loose their data and want to maximise their data
reliability, which is also conceived as a risk averse behaviour.
In this paper, we compute the utility of agents by incorporating some fundamental
aspects such as the disk failure rate, the value (or benefit) associated with the data,
and the cost to an agent for maintaining relationship with others. We discuss this
utility function under two different frameworks, namely Multi-Objective Framework
and Single-Objective Framework. As far as we know, in the social storage literature,
this is the first attempt of its kind. The most challenging aspect of designing the utility
function used by us is that it is simple, yet captures the behavior of the system well.
Our utility model can also easily extendible to more realistic scenarios involving the
online availability of agents, the bandwidth available to them, the agent heterogeneity,
and trust.
1.3 Our Solution Concept and Technique
In the endogenous network formation model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), ratio-
nal decision makers build a network by interacting with each other. Here, the pairwise
stability solution concept takes agents’ mutual consent into account while building a
relationship (that is, adding a link in the network). But, any agent can decide not to
maintain a relationship (that is, delete any of its existing links) without consent of the
agent at the other end of the link.
However, the social storage system discussed earlier, impels us to focus on the
requirement of bilateral consent while deleting a link as well. For instance, let agents
i and j be backup partners. That is, i provides its storage space to j for the purpose
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of storing j′s data, and vice versa. Now, let us assume that breaking a backup part-
nership without mutual consent is allowed. If agent i breaks the partnership without
consent of j, then there is a threat that j will lose its data which is stored on i′s storage
space. Hence, backup partnerships in social storage networks have to be viewed as
mutual contracts which cannot be broken unilaterally. We call this as bilateral stabil-
ity. This definition of bilateral stability also applies to other contexts where mutual
consent is required for deletion, for example, service level agreements in the Cloud.
We give a brief overview of the strategic network formation literature (specifically,
link formation strategies), other solution concepts, and how bilateral stability relates
to them in the next section.
The rest of this paper is divided into seven more sections. In Section 2, we dis-
cuss past work done in strategic network formation. Here, we glance at different util-
ity functions and different solution concepts. In Section 3, we formally describe our
social storage model and compute the utility of agents. In Section 3.2, we study the
endogenous social storage network formation game by focusing on mutual consent
for both link addition and deletion. That is, we propose our solution concept of bilat-
eral stability. In Section 4, we provide some necessary and sufficient conditions for
bilateral stability of social storage networks. Here, we first define the stability point
(the ideal neighborhood size) such that no agent gains by deviating from the stabil-
ity point. Then, we show that there exists a unique stability point independent of the
number of agents (for all non-trivial cases). We also show that there exist unique and
non-unique pairwise stable storage networks under certain conditions. Also, given the
number of agents and other parameters, we discuss which pairwise stable networks
would evolve. In Section 5, we do further analysis related to stability, efficiency as
well as contentment of networks, e.g. efficient networks are always stable in the con-
text we study. In Section 6, we look at related work, and in Section 7 we conclude the
paper and discuss future work.
2 Background
Strategic network formation literature is vast. In rest of this section, we first sum-
marise few seminal works in utility function design. Then, we visit few important
works in strategic network formation modelling. Finally, we end this section with a
brief survey of impactful solution concepts. We also relate our contribution to the
state-of-the-art work in each of these three areas.
We do not focus on papers which look at applications (Belleflamme and Bloch,
2004; Goyal and Joshi, 2006a; Furusawa and Konishi, 2007; Bala and Goyal, 2000b;
Goyal and Moraga-Gonza´lez, 2001; Goyal and Joshi, 2003; Zirulia, 2006; Suijs et al,
2005; Skorin-Kapov, 2017) or touch on other tangential topics. For example, anti-
coordination among agents (Bramoulle´ et al, 2004); contextual and correlated peer
effects (Bramoulle´ et al, 2009); partner heterogeneity (Billand et al, 2011); and Nash
and stable characterisation for a graph structure (Bramoulle´ et al, 2014).
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2.1 Utility Function in the Model
As pointed out earlier, a utility function is an important element of a strategic network
formation game. This reveals individual benefit-cost tradeoff in a network. Utility
functions are either degree based (only direct connections) or distance based (direct
as well as indirect connections).
In degree based utility functions, one is only concerned about the effects of its lo-
cal neighbourhood. This is the case for us too. Although indirect connections are not
considered explicitly here, they do effect an agent’s utility either positively or neg-
atively. For example, in the co-author model (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996), where
agents are involved in a collaborative project, an individual’s utility goes down if its
neighbours are tightly connected (or agents are densely connected in the network). In
the job contact network (Calvo´-Armengol, 2004), for an individual, the probability
of getting job information increases as its neighbourhood size increases. However,
it also depends on how the individuals are connected (tightly or loosely) and unem-
ployment in the network.
Distance based modelling is suitable for those settings where agents are aiming to
minimise the cost of communication. The connection model (Jackson and Wolinsky,
1996), the network creation game (Fabrikant et al, 2003), the locality game (Mosci-
broda et al, 2011), are some examples where a distance based utility function is used.
In the social storage context, Blackburn et al (2014) suggests explicitly exploiting
indirect relationships so as to maximise data reliability and availability. In our view,
this approach is in-general suitable for those systems that utilise exogenous social
relationships (i.e., a social graph).
2.2 Network Formation Game in the Model
Most exhaustive survey of network formation games and games on networks has been
done in the following works: Dutta and Jackson (2003); Jackson (2005); Tennekes
(2010); Goyal (2012); Borkotokey et al (2014). Few standard models broadly cover
strategic network formation modelling. This includes, the cooperative game theory
model, the unilateral connection model, the link investments model, and the bilateral
connection model (Tennekes (2010)). Next, we briefly discuss these models and also
relate them to our model.
Aumann and Myerson (1988) have proposed an extensive network formation
game, where agents form links sequentially (one after another) using some exoge-
nous rules. Agents propose with whom they want to form links, and later that pro-
posal is either accepted or rejected by others. But once a link is formed between a
pair of agents, it cannot withdrawn. This is the essence of the cooperative game the-
ory model. In the unilateral connection model, agents form links without consent and
links are directional (Bala and Goyal (2000a)). In the link investments model (Bloch
and Jackson (2007)) and its variant (Bloch and Dutta (2009)), agents propose invest-
ments for their every direct link. These investments are either positive or negative.
Linking between a pair of agents takes place if and only if total investment on that
link is positive.
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Myerson (1977) has proposed the link-announcement game. In this agents propos-
ing to form links, announce the name of the agents with whom they want to form these
links. This announcement is done simultaneously. A link between two agents takes
place if only if both announce each others name. Inspired by the link-announcement
model, Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) proposed the pairwise connection model. Here,
link formation takes place with the mutual consent of the involved agents, however,
link deletion takes place without consent. Our social storage network formation game
is inspired by the pairwise connection model. We differ in the link deletion scenario,
where for deleting a link, both the agents involved must agree.
2.3 Solution Concept
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) have argued that the Nash equilibrium as a solution
concept is not useful in the network formation context for two reasons. First, due
to the existence of multiple Nash equilibrium, and second, it fails to capture mutual
consent of agents in link formation. Hence, they have proposed the pairwise stabil-
ity solution concept. In this paper, we have shown that there is a need to refine the
pairwise stability solution concept in the social storage context. We have changed the
deletion condition of the pairwise stability so that it is suitable in our context. We call
this concept as bilateral stability.
Our solution concept of bilateral stability subsumes the concept of bilateral equi-
librium proposed by Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007). The set of all strategies that
are bilaterally stable contains the set of all bilateral equilibrium strategies. A net-
work which is bilaterally stable may contain agents who may be better off by deviat-
ing, where as a bilateral equilibrium network does not contain any such agent. Both
definitions, however, allow only bilateral deviations (or pairwise addition as well as
deletion with mutual consent). Buechel and Hellmann (2012) have termed bilateral
equilibrium as bilateral stability. Hummon (2000) also discusses mutual consent for
deletion, but he does not formally define or study the concept of stability with mutual
consent for deletion. The author performs agent based simulation of the connection
model proposed by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), and discusses simulation outputs.
Other works that focus on agent based simulations are by Falk and Kosfeld (2012)
and Goeree et al (2009).
Other network formation game solution concepts, for example, strong and coalition-
proof Nash equilibria (Dutta and Mutuswami, 1997); strong pairwise stability (Jack-
son and van den Nouweland, 2005); pairwise stable Nash equilibrium (Goyal and
Joshi, 2006b); farsighted equilibrium (Dutta et al, 2005); Nash-Cournot equilibrium
(Fla˚m and Horvath, 1996); and monadic stability (Gilles and Sarangi, 2010) are rele-
vant in variants of the scenario we discuss in this paper.
3 Social Storage Network Model
Definition 1 A social storage network g= (A,L) consists of a set of agents, A, and
a set of links connecting these agents, L, where a link between two agents represents
a data backup partnership between them.
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Table 1 Notation Summary
g social storage network.
A set of agents (or vertices).
N number of agents in g (that is, N is the number of elements in the set A).
L set of links (or edges).
〈i j〉 link between agents i and j.
ai j indicator for data backup partnership between agents i and j.
c cost incurred by an agent to maintain a link.
βi worth (or value) that agent i has for its data.
si amount of storage available with agent i that it can contribute to other agents.
di amount of data that agent i wants to backup.
bi budget allocated by agent i towards backup partnerships.
λ probability of failure of a disk.
ηi(g) neighborhood size of agent i in g. (Also denotes the set of neighbors of i).
g+ 〈i j〉 new link 〈i j〉 is added to g.
g−〈i j〉 existing link 〈i j〉 is deleted from g.
G (N) the set of all networks on N agents.
g(κi) a component of network g, where κi is the set of agents in that component.
gc complement of network g.
Given a social storage network g = (A,L), the link 〈i j〉 ∈ L represents the fact
that agents i and j are neighbors of each other, and are involved in a data backup part-
nership. This partnership indicates that both the agents commit to share their storage
resources with each other so that they can backup their data on each other’s shared
storage space. Storage resource sharing and data backup activity are bidirectional and
occur with the mutual consent of i and j. This implies, the link 〈i j〉 and the link 〈 ji〉
are identical. We also refer to i and j as backup partners. The set of agents with whom
agent i has links is represented by ηi(g). In other words, ηi(g) is the neighborhood of
agent i. We also use ηi(g) to represent the neighborhood size of i, which will be clear
from the context.
At any given point in time, each agent plays a dual role: that of a data owner who
wants to back up its data, and that of storage provider who provides storage space
for each of its backup partners. Pairs of agents may add a new link (or continue to
maintain the existing link) or delete the existing link (or continue to remain without a
link). In the context of social storage, mutual consent is necessary for adding as well
as for deleting links. That is, an agent does not add a new link without the consent of
the agent with whom it wants to add the new link and does not delete an existing link
without the consent of the agent from whom it wants to delete the existing link.
The structure of the network, g, is determined by actions of the agents. Firstly,
the network is updated when two agents i and j add a new link 〈i j〉, and we denote
this by g+〈i j〉. Secondly, the network is updated when a pair agents i and j delete an
existing link 〈i j〉, and we denote this by g−〈i j〉. As agents themselves decide with
whom they want to perform backup partnerships and with whom they do not, this is a
process of endogenous network formation (or partner selection). In this paper, we do
not explicitly consider trust between pairs of agents. We assume that all agents trust
each other, and thus, anyone can form links with anyone.
A social storage network may be connected or may consist of two or more con-
nected components. We say a network g is connected if there exists a path between
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every pair of agents i and j ∈A, or else the network g is disconnected. A disconnected
network g can be partitioned into disjoint sub-networks g(κ1),g(κ2), ...,g(κn), where
κ1∪κ2∪ . . .∪κn = A,κr ∩κs = φ for all r,s ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n},r 6= s, such that any pair
of agents i and j are connected if and only if i and j are elements of the same set κr.
Such sub-networks are called as components of the network g.
A complete network is one where every agent is connected to every other agent.
A null (or empty) network is one where there are no links — that is, no agent is
connected to any agent. A component which is complete is called a clique.
An r-regular network is one where each agent has exactly r neighbors. An N
agent star network consists of a single universal agent and N− 1 pendant agents. A
universal agent is one who is adjacent to other N−1 pendant agents. A pendant agent
is one who is adjacent to only the universal agent. A star component is a component
which is a star (sub-)network.
The complement of network g, denoted by gc, is a network on the same set of
agents such that 〈i j〉 ∈ gc if and only if 〈i j〉 6∈ g.
Table 1 summarizes all notations used in this paper.
3.1 Utility of an Agent in a Social Storage Network
Data stored on local hard disk is in danger of getting lost or damaged due to local
disk failure. Hence, to keep data safe, each data owner wants to backup its data.
Social storage systems use two types of techniques to backup data. The first is erasure
coding, and the second is replication6 (Oliveira et al, 2008). Erasure coding is the data
redundancy technique in which a data object is divided into x blocks and recoded into
y blocks (y > x). Then the main data block can be recovered from any subset of y.
Replication is the data redundancy technique in which an agent maintains a single
data copy on each partner’s storage device. In this paper, we consider the replication
technique. As hard disks are prone to failure, there is a chance that a data owner’s
backup partner’s hard disk also fails. It is likely that each backup partner’s hard disk
fails, so each data owner’s interest lies in recovering at least one copy of its data so
that the value of the data is intact. It is not hard to observe that each agent’s chance of
data recovery, given a particular disk failure rate, depends on its neighborhood size.
The more the number of neighbors, the higher the chance of data recovery.
In the absence of costs to add and maintain links, the aim of each agent in a social
storage network is to maximize the chance of data recovery, given that the local copy
of data has been damaged or lost. However, every agent incurs a cost for each of its
links. Keeping this in mind, we define the utility of each agent in the network under
two frameworks. The utility of agent i in the network g is represented by a function
ui : G (A)→R, where G is the set of all networks, (g is an element of G ). The profile
of utility functions (u1, ...,un) is a vector of utilities for all agents. We first define
the parameters required to define the utility function. λ ∈ (0,1) is the average disk
failure rate in the network. That is, at any point in time, the probability of failure of
agent i’s disk is λ . For data owner (agent) i, the value of the local data that is to be
6Weatherspoon and Kubiatowicz (2002) perform quantitative comparisons between these two tech-
niques.
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backed up, is βi. Each agent incurs a cost c to maintain a link. That is, the total cost
of adding and/ or maintaining a link is 2c, and we assume that the agents connected
by the link equally share this cost. This cost can be interpreted as the cost required
for infrastructure, bandwidth, time, etc. There is no additional cost to add a new
link. Each agent i also has allocated budget bi for maintaining its links. Further, each
agent i has a certain amount of local data di that the agent wants to store on storage
devices of backup partners. Also, each agent i has a certain amount of storage space
si available for sharing with other agents in the network. Using these parameters, we
now define the utility of an agent in the following two frameworks.
3.1.1 Multi-Objective Framework (MO-Framework)
In the first framework, there are two objective functions that each agent i tries to
optimise. Firstly, each agent i wants to minimise the total cost associated with main-
taining the links, i.e., cηi(g). Secondly, each agent wants to maximise the expected
value of backup data. Since the disk failure rate is λ , and i has ηi(g) neighbors, the
expected value of i’s backup data is βi(1−ληi(g)). Note that, as each agent is inter-
ested in “how many links to maintain”, we look at the expected value of an agent’s
backup data given that the local copy of the agent’s data has been damaged or lost.
For each agent i, these two objective functions can be written as a single objective
function as follows:
[α(βi(1−ληi(g)))]− [(1−α)(cηi(g))], where α ∈ (0,1). (1)
For elegance of results on stability, we let α = 1/2. We drop the factor of 1/2 from
(1), for all i ∈ A, and just consider the following utility function ui(g), for all i ∈ A,
for the given network g:
ui(g) = βi(1−ληi(g))− cηi(g). (2)
As evident above, this is no longer a MO-optimization problem. We have done
this conversion because (a) this is one of the easiest way to solve a MO-problem, and
(b) our focus is on the network formation game, stability, efficiency, and contented-
ness of the network. Solving the MO-optimization problem without this conversion
is part of future work, and we discuss that in Section 7. We also still call this a MO-
framework a nomenclature (to differentiate with Single Objective (SO)-framework
discussed below).
Each agent i wants to maximise ui(g) over all possible values of ηi(g). The social
optimisation problem can be formulated as
max ∑
i∈A
(ui(g))
such that
ηi(g) = ∑
i, j∈g
ai j and
si ≥ ∑
j∈ηi(g)
d jai j,
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where,
ai j =
{
1 if i and j have a backup agreement,
0 otherwise.
3.1.2 Single Objective Framework (SO-Framework)
In this framework, each agent i has only one objective (as compared to two in the pre-
vious framework). Each agent tries to maximise the expected value of backup data.
The cost, cηi(g), incurred by agent i to maintain links (which was the second objec-
tive function in the MO-Framework), appears in constraints here. This is because, in
the SO-Framework, every agent i has an allocated budget, bi, towards backup agree-
ments.
For the given network g, utility ui(g) of agent i is
ui(g) = βi(1−ληi(g)).
Each agent i wants to maximise ui(g) over all possible values of ηi(g). The social
optimisation problem can be formulated as
max ∑
i∈A
(ui(g))
such that
ηi(g) = ∑
i, j∈g
ai j,
si ≥ ∑
j∈ηi(g)
d jai j,and
bi ≥ cηi(g),
where,
ai j =
{
1 if i and j have a backup agreement,
0 otherwise.
Remark 1 The utility function in the SO-Framework may be reduced to the Constant
Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA Pratt (1964))7 function. In the context of social stor-
age, agents are risk averse as they do not want to “risk” losing their data, which is
what the above utility function captures. This function may also be viewed as the
Cumulative Distribution Function of an Exponential distribution, given that the disk
failure rate is Poisson.
7We refer the readers to a survey by Meyer (2010) on functional forms for the utility functions of
agents, based on their risk taking abilities.
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Remark 2 We explicitly write the formulation of the social optimization problems
in the two different frameworks, as above, primarily to highlight that the cost is
moved from the utility function in the MO-framework to budget constraints in the
SO-framework. Our goal is not to solve these problems but rather analyze the corre-
sponding network properties, for example, the efficiency of the resulting networks.
3.2 Bilateral Stability, Efficiency and Contentedness
There is a need for a solution concept which is suitable for characterizing the storage
network formation game. A strategic network formation game (NFG) is described as
below. NFG consists of a set of agents A = {1,2, ...,N} who represent nodes in the
network g — if i is an agent, we use i∈A and i∈ g synonymously. In this setting, pairs
of agents may form new links thereby increasing their expected value of backup data,
by incurring higher costs to maintain links. Pairs of agents may also delete existing
links, thereby reducing the costs incurred, but reducing the probability of retrieving
the data too. The shape of the network is not only defined by each agent’s cost and
benefit trade off, but also by limitation of resources available with the agents.
Pairwise stability introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) (see Definition 2)
is an appropriate solution concept when agents require mutual consent while adding
a link, but any agent can delete any of its existing links without consent.
Definition 2 (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) A network g is pairwise stable if and
only if
1. for all 〈i j〉 ∈ g, ui(g)≥ ui(g−〈i j〉) and u j(g)≥ u j(g−〈i j〉), and
2. for all 〈i j〉 6∈ g, if ui(g+ 〈i j〉)> ui(g), then u j(g+ 〈i j〉)< u j(g).
We modify the pairwise stability concept introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996) so as to ensure that deletion of links also happens with mutual consent. We
call this modified pairwise stability as bilateral stability.
Bilateral equilibrium (Goyal and Vega-Redondo, 2007) is another refinement of
pairwise stability (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996). Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007)
define strategies of agents as sets of links they would want to add, and define bilateral
equilibrium as a strategy profile that is a Nash equilibrium (that is, no agent benefits
by unilaterally deviating) and is pairwise stable (where both addition and deletion
require mutual consent). The set of all bilaterally stable strategies (see Definition 3) is
a superset of the set of all bilateral equilibrium strategies (Goyal and Vega-Redondo,
2007), as discussed earlier.
The modified definition of pairwise stability we use for social storage is given
below.
Definition 3 A social storage network g is bilaterally stable if and only if
1. for all 〈i j〉 ∈ g, if ui(g−〈i j〉)> ui(g), then u j(g−〈i j〉)< u j(g), and
2. for all 〈i j〉 6∈ g, if ui(g+ 〈i j〉)> ui(g), then u j(g+ 〈i j〉)< u j(g).
Definition 3 is a network stability concept, whose first part states that no pair
of agents with a link between them, wants to delete the link, and the second part
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states that no pair of agents has an incentive to add a new link. Note that neither
link formation (addition) nor link deletion can happen without mutual consent. Our
further discussions about social storage stability stands on Definition 3.
Remark 3 Definition 3 can be rewritten using only conditions on the addition of links
by rewriting the first condition (that is, the deletion condition) as a condition for addi-
tion in gc. Similarly, we can also rewrite Definition 3 using only deletion conditions.
Now, we generalize Definition 3 so that it is suitable as a solution concept for the
two frameworks discussed in the previous section.
For this, we first define remaining storage available with agent i in a network g as
RSi = si− ∑
j∈ηi(g)
d jai j, (3)
and remaining budget of agent i in g as
RBi = bi− ∑
j∈ηi(g)
cai j, (4)
where
ai j =
{
1 if i and j have a backup agreement,
0 otherwise.
For the MO-Framework, where we have storage constraints, the following modi-
fication of Definition 3 is appropriate.
Definition 4 A social storage network g with storage constraints is bilaterally stable
if and only if
1. for all 〈i j〉 ∈ g, if ui(g−〈i j〉)> ui(g), then u j(g−〈i j〉)< u j(g), and
2. for all 〈i j〉 6∈ g, if [ui(g+ 〈i j〉)> ui(g) and RS j ≥ di], then
[u j(g+ 〈i j〉)< u j(g) or RSi < d j].
In the above definition, there is no change in the link deletion condition of Defi-
nition 3. However, while adding a link, an agent has to ensure that the other agent has
sufficient storage to store its data (besides ensuring increase in its utility). We assume
that the agents are rational and self-centered (and hence, it is up to agent j to check
whether agent i has sufficient storage for agent j’s data or not).
Next, we adapt Definition 3 for the SO-Framework, where we have storage and
budget constraints.
Definition 5 A social storage network g with storage and budget constraints is bilat-
erally stable if and only if
1. for all 〈i j〉 ∈ g, if ui(g−〈i j〉)> ui(g), then u j(g−〈i j〉)< u j(g), and
2. for all 〈i j〉 6∈ g, if [ui(g+ 〈i j〉)> ui(g) and RS j ≥ di and RBi ≥ c)], then
[u j(g+ 〈i j〉)< u j(g) or RSi < d j or RB j < c].
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As in the case of MO-Framework, there is no change in the link deletion condition
of Definition 3. However, while adding a link, an agent has to ensure that the other
agent has sufficient storage to store its data and agent itself has sufficient budget to
form the link (besides ensuring increase in its utility). This is, again, based on the
assumption that the agents are rational and self-centered.
We, now, define efficient and contented social storage networks, with as well
as without constraints. Efficient social storage networks are social storage networks
where as many agents as possible achieve maximum utility, whereas contented social
storage networks are those where all agents achieve maximum utility.
Definition 6 A social storage network g is efficient with respect to utility profile
(u1, ...,uN) if ∑
i
ui(g)≥ ∑
i
ui(g′), for all g′ ∈ G (N).
Definition 7 A social storage network g with storage constraints is efficient with
respect to utility profile (u1, ...,uN) if ∑
i
ui(g) ≥ ∑
i
ui(g′), for all g′ ∈ G (N) where
RSi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ g′ .
Definition 8 A social storage network g with storage and budget constraints is effi-
cient with respect to utility profile (u1, ...,uN) if ∑
i
ui(g)≥ ∑
i
ui(g′), for all g′ ∈ G (N)
where RSi ≥ 0 and RBi ≥ 0, for all i ∈ g′ .
Definition 9 A social storage network g is contented with respect to utility profile
(u1, ...,uN) if, for each i ∈ A, ui = max
ηi(g)
(βi(1− ληi(g))− cηi(g)), under the MO-
Framework, and ui = max
ηi(g)
(βi(1−ληi(g))), under the SO-Framework.
Remark 4 If maximum possible utility is not achievable by a one or more agents be-
cause of storage or budget constraints, then those agents are not contented, and hence,
the social storage network is not contented. Therefore, we do not define contented-
ness with constraints.
4 Stable Network Characterization and Stability Point
In this section, we study the stability aspects of social storage networks considering
the utilities of agents and the solutions concept as defined in Sections 3.1 and 3.2,
respectively.
Free riding is a situation where an agent offers less storage space, but consumes
more. To deal with free riding, many backup systems have used the concept of sym-
metric resource sharing (or equal resource trading). Internet Cooperative Backup Sys-
tem (Lillibridge et al, 2003), PeerStore (Landers et al, 2004), Pastiche (Cox et al,
2002), are a few examples of P2P backup systems, which use symmetric resource
trading to mitigate free riding.
We term a social storage system with symmetric resource sharing as a symmetric
social storage system. We consider symmetry in the agents’ value of their respective
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data, storage space available, amount of data to be shared, and budget in two different
scenarios. These scenarios are discussed next.
Definition 10 A symmetric value network (SVN) g is a social storage network where
the benefit (value) associated with backed-up data is the same for all agents in the
network, i.e., βi = β j (say β ), for all i, j ∈ A, and hence, utility of each agent i in the
network is
ui(g) = β (1−ληi(g))− cηi(g) for MO-Framework 3.1.1 and,
ui(g) = β (1−ληi(g)) for SO-Framework 3.1.2,
(5)
where β ,λ ,c ∈ (0,1).
uunionsq
Definition 11 A symmetric resource network (SRN) g is a social storage network
where all agents in g have an equal amount of (limited) storage space available to
them, an equal amount of data that they want to backup, and have the same budget.
That is, for all i, j ∈ g, si = s j (say s), di = d j (say d), and bi = b j (say b).
Remark 5 From this symmetric setup, we can move to real life scenarios in many
ways. We can have different value of cost and benefit for different agents. Another
way to include heterogeneity in this model is by using the concept of Social Range
Matrix (Kuznetsov and Schmid, 2010), which we have done recently (Jain et al.,
2018). Here, each agent is concerned about its perceived utility, which is a linear
combination of its utility as well as others utilities (depending upon whether the pair
are friends, enemies or do not care about each other).
Now, we work with SVN under the MO-Framework, where each agent in the
given network g has as much storage as is required for all other agents in g. That is,
si ≥ ∑
j∈g,
j 6=i
d j, for all i ∈ g. (6)
Note that si may be different from some other s j. For convenience, we shall call such
a network as SVN with sufficient storage. The reason we do this is that it leads to the
results of the realistic scenario, that is, SV-SRN under the MO-Framework.
Remark 6 An SV-SRN, g under the MO-Framework is a social storage network
where the utility of each agent i ∈ g is ui(g) = βi(1− ληi(g))− cηi(g), and for all
agents i, j ∈ g, βi = β j,si = s j, and di = d j.
Next, we work with SVN under the SO-Framework where each agent in the given
network g has as much storage as is required for all other agents in g, and each
agent in the given network g has as much budget as is required to maintain backup-
partnerships with every other agent in g. That is,
si≥ ∑
j∈A, j 6=i
d j, for all i∈ g, and, bi≥ c(N−1), for all i∈ g where N = |A|.
(7)
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As in the SO-Framework, this leads to the scenario of SV-SRN under the SO-
Framework. However, for SO-Framework, we present the results for SRN directly
rather than SV-SRN. This is because SV-SRN is a subset of SRN and so, what holds
for SRN does for SV-SRN as well.
Remark 7 An SV-SRN, g under the SO-Framework is a social storage network where
the utility of each agent i ∈ g is ui(g) = βi(1− ληi(g)), and for all agents i, j ∈ g,
βi = β j,si = s j,di = d j, and bi = b j.
For ease of exposition, from now onwards, whenever we discuss SVN networks,
we will always assume sufficiency of every resource — that is, sufficient storage un-
der MO-Framework, and sufficient storage and budget under SO-Framework. When-
ever we discuss SRN or SV-SRN networks, we will not make these assumptions of
sufficiency. These are summarised in Table 2.
Table 2 Summary of Network Study under Different Frameworks with/ without Sufficient Resources.
Network Type Framework Resource Availability
SVN MO-Framework Sufficient Storage.
SV-SRN MO-Framework Limited Storage and Limited Budget.
SVN SO-Framework Sufficient Storage and Sufficient Budget.
SRN SO-Framework Limited Storage and Limited Budget.
In the following subsections, we characterize bilaterally stable symmetric social
storage networks, by first deriving the deviation conditions — conditions for an agent
to have an incentive to add or delete a link, given the network parameters (that is, disk
failure rate λ , value of backup data β , and the cost of maintaining a link c). This also
gives us necessary and sufficient conditions for bilateral stability, in terms of the net-
work parameters (λ , β , and c). Further, this makes it easier to visualize a bilaterally
stable network, and we use these conditions to derive the ideal neighborhood size
for having a bilaterally stable network. We term this ideal neighborhood size as the
stability point (see Definition 12).
Definition 12 Given a network g, we define the stability point ηˆ of g as the neigh-
borhood size (degree) such that no agent in g has any incentive to increase its neigh-
borhood size to more than ηˆ and to decrease it to less than ηˆ .
We, now, characterize SVN and SV-SRN under the MO-Framework, and SVN
and SRN under the SO-Framework. Further, we prove uniqueness of the stability
point of these networks and also show that the stability point is independent of the
number of agents for all cases under the MO-Framework and for all cases but one
trivial case under the SO-Framework, the trivial case being SVN with sufficient stor-
age and sufficient budget where it is easy to see that the complete network is the only
stable network.
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4.1 Characterization Under the MO-Framework
In this subsection, we characterize bilaterally stable SVN and SV-SRN under the
MO-Framework. We, first, derive conditions under which an agent has an incentive
to add a new link or delete an existing link. Then, we derive necessary and sufficient
conditions for bilateral stability of SVN and SV-SRN under the MO-Framework,
and prove that the stability point of these networks is unique and independent of the
number of agents.
Lemma 1 In an SVN g, under the MO-Framework, for any agent i ∈ g, forming a
partnership with another agent j ∈ g is beneficial if and only if c< βληi(g)[1−λ ].
Proof As g is an SVN under the MO-Framework,
ui(g) = β (1−ληi(g))− cηi(g), for all i ∈ g.
For i, j ∈ g, if 〈i j〉 6∈ g, then
ui(g+ 〈i j〉) = [β (1−ληi(g)+1)]− [c(ηi(g)+1)].
Adding a new link or backup partner is beneficial for i if and only if
ui(g+ 〈i j〉)> ui(g), if and only if
[β (1−ληi(g)+1)− c(ηi(g)+1)]> [β (1−ληi(g))− c(ηi(g))], if and only if
c< β [ληi(g)−ληi(g)+1]. uunionsq
Remark 8 The term on the left-hand side of the inequality in Lemma 1 is the cost c
that agent i incurs in order to add a new neighbour j. The term on the right-hand side
is the expected benefit that agent i receives by forming a new link with neighbour j.
Lemma 2 In an SVN g, under the MO-Framework, for any agent i ∈ g, breaking an
existing partnership with another agent j ∈ g is beneficial if and only if
c> βληi(g)−1[1−λ ].
Proof As g is an SVN, under the MO-Framework, ui(g) = β (1− ληi(g))− cηi(g),
for all i ∈ g.
If 〈i j〉 ∈ g, then ui(g−〈i j〉) = [β (1−ληi(g)−1)]− [c(ηi(g)−1)].
Deleting an existing link is beneficial for any agent i if and only if
ui(g−〈i j〉)> ui(g)), if and only if
[β (1−ληi(g)−1)− c(ηi(g)−1)]> [β (1−ληi(g))− c(ηi(g))], if and only if
c> β [ληi(g)−1−ληi(g)]. uunionsq
Remark 9 We interpret Lemma 2 in lines similar to Remark 8.
Theorem 1 An SVN g, under the MO-Framework, is bilaterally stable if and only if
1. for all 〈i j〉 ∈ g, if βληi(g)−1[1−λ ]< c, then βλη j(g)−1[1−λ ]> c, and
2. for all 〈i j〉 6∈ g, if βληi(g)[1−λ ]> c, then βλη j(g)[1−λ ]< c.
Proof Follows from Lemma 1, Lemma 2 and Definition 3 of bilateral stability. uunionsq
18 P. Mane, K. Ahuja, N. Krishnamurthy
We state and prove the following for SV-SRN, under the MO-Framework.
Lemma 3 Let g be an SV-SRN, under the MO-Framework. For any agent i ∈ g,
adding a new partnership with agent j ∈ g is beneficial if and only if
(c< βληi(g)[1−λ ] and s−dη j(g)≥ d),
and breaking an existing partnership with agent j ∈ g is beneficial if and only if
c> βληi(g)−1[1−λ ].
Proof If 〈i j〉 6∈ g, agent i has an incentive to add a link with agent j, if and only if
c< β [ληi(g)−ληi(g)+1] (from Lemma 1), where ηi(g) = neighborhood size of i,
and the amount of storage available with agent j ≥ agent i’s
data size, if and only if
c< β [ληi(g)−ληi(g)+1] and s j− ∑
k∈η j(g)
dk ≥ di,
where η j(g) is the set of neighbors of j, if and only if
c< β [ληi(g)−ληi(g)+1] and s−dη j(g)≥ d, (as sk = sl ,dk = dl , for all k, l ∈ g),
where η j(g) is the neighborhood size of j.
To delete an existing link, agent i only looks at the cost for maintain the link, and
hence, from Lemma 2, agent i has an incentive to delete a link if and only if
c> β [ληi(g)−1−ληi(g)]. uunionsq
Theorem 2 An SV-SRN g, under the MO-Framework, is bilaterally stable if and only
if
1. for all 〈i j〉 ∈ g, βληi(g)−1[1−λ ]< c⇒ βλη j(g)−1[1−λ ]> c, and
2. for all 〈i j〉 6∈ g, βληi(g)[1−λ ]> c and s−dη j(g)≥ d⇒
βλη j(g)[1−λ ]< c or s−dηi(g)< d.
Proof Follows from Lemma 3, and Definition 4 of bilateral stability. uunionsq
Now, we look at the stability point of SVN and SV-SRN under the MO-
Framework.
Theorem 3 Let g be an SVN under the MO-Framework. Then, the stability point ηˆ
of g is unique and is given by ηˆ =
⌈ | ln( cβ (1−λ ) )|
| lnλ |
⌉
=
⌊ |(ln cλβ (1−λ ) )|
| lnλ |
⌋
.
Proof From Lemma 1, adding a link for agent i is beneficial if and only if
ηi(g) lnλ > ln( cβ (1−λ ) ), if and only if
ηi(g)<
| ln( cβ (1−λ ) )|
| lnλ |
Hence, for agent i, increasing neighborhood size is not beneficial if and only if
ηi(g)≥
| ln( cβ (1−λ ) )|
| lnλ | .
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Similarly, from Lemma 2, deleting a link for agent i is beneficial if and only if
ln( cλβ (1−λ ) )> ηi(g) lnλ , if and only if
| ln( cλβ (1−λ ) )|
| lnλ | < ηi(g)
So, decreasing neighborhood size is not beneficial for agent i if and only if
| ln( cλβ (1−λ ) )|
| lnλ | ≥ ηi(g).
Therefore, L =
| ln( cβ (1−λ ) )|
| lnλ | and U =
| ln( cλβ (1−λ ) )|
| lnλ | are, respectively, the lower and upper
bounds of ηˆ .
U =
| ln( cβ (1−λ ) )|
| lnλ | +
| lnλ |
| lnλ | = L+1.
It is easy to see that if L is not an integer (and hence, U is not an integer), the stability
point ηˆ is the unique positive integer between L and U . uunionsq
Remark 10 For most values of c,β , and λ ,
| ln( cβ (1−λ ) )|
| lnλ | , and hence,
| ln( cλβ (1−λ ) )|
| lnλ | are
non-integers.
Example 1 Consider the networks g and s (see Fig. 1). In both the networks, let
the cost c = 0.0055, β = 0.6, and λ = 0.2. Here,
⌈ | ln( cβ (1−λ ) )|
| lnλ |
⌉
= d2.72e and⌊ |(ln cλβ (1−λ ) )|
| lnλ |
⌋
= b3.72c, and hence, ηˆ = 3. In network g, all agents have three neigh-
bours each, and hence, g is bilaterally stable. Despite the fact that agent g in the
network s has an incentive to add one more link, network s is also bilaterally stable.
(a) Network g (b) Network s
Fig. 1 Stable SVN Networks under the MO-Framework with Sufficient Storage
Now, we derive the stability point for SV-SRN network under the MO-
Framework. Here, Definition 4 is relevant, and for simplicity, we assume that sd is
an integer.
Theorem 4 Let g be an SV-SRN, under the MO-Framework.
Then, n˜ = min{ηˆ , sd }, is the unique stability point of g.
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Proof If all agents have sufficient storage, then from Theorem 3, ηˆ is the stability
point.
Now, let us assume that each agent has a total amount of storage, s, available
for sharing, d amount of data to backup. Then, sd defines the maximum possible
neighborhood size of each agent in the network.
Therefore, min{ηˆ , sd } is the stability point, given c,λ ,β ,s,d.
Alternatively, we may also use the bound sd in Lemmas 1, 2 and Theorem 3. uunionsq
Henceforth, for the sake of uniformity, we shall use ηˆ (and not n˜) for the stability
point of SV-SRN under the MO-Framework too.
4.2 Characterization Under the SO-Framework
In this subsection, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for bilateral stability
of SVN and SRN under the SO-Framework, and then discuss the stability point of
these networks.
Lemma 4 In an SVN, g, under the SO-Framework, for any agent i ∈ g, forming a
partnership with another agent j ∈ g is always beneficial.
Proof As g is an SVN, under the SO-Framework, ui(g) = β (1−ληi(g)), for all i ∈ g.
For i, j ∈ g, if 〈i j〉 6∈ g, then ui(g+ 〈i j〉) = [β (1−ληi(g)+1)].
Adding a new link or backup partner is beneficial for agent i if and only if
ui(g+ 〈i j〉)> ui(g), if and only if
[β (1−ληi(g)+1)]> [β (1−ληi(g))], if and only if
ληi(g)+1 < ληi(g), if and only if
λ < 1, which is always true. uunionsq
Corollary 1 In an SVN, g, under the SO-Framework, no agent benefits by deleting
any existing partnership.
Theorem 5 An SVN, g, under the SO-Framework, is bilaterally stable if and only if
g is a complete network.
Proof Follows from Lemma 4 and Corollary 1.
Now, we state and prove the following for SRN, under the SO-Framework.
Lemma 5 In an SRN, g, under the SO-Framework, for any agent i ∈ g, forming a
partnership with another agent j ∈ g is beneficial if and only if b− cηi(g) ≥ c and
s−dη j(g)≥ d.
Proof In the SO-Framework, the utility of each agent i ∈ g increases with increase
in its neighborhood size ηi(g).
Therefore, for any agent i ∈ g, forming a partnership with another agent j ∈ g is
beneficial if and only if agent i’s budget allows this link addition and agent j has free
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storage space for agent i’s data. (Refer Definition 5).
Agent j has free storage space for i’s data, if and only if s−dη j(g)≥ d. (Similar
to the proof of Lemma 3).
Similarly, agent i’s budget allows adding a link, if and only if b−cηi(g)≥ c. uunionsq
Corollary 2 In an SRN, g, under the SO-Framework, no agent benefits by deleting
any existing partnership.
Theorem 6 An SRN g under the SO-Framework is bilaterally stable if and only if
[b− cηi(g) ≥ c and s− dη j(g) ≥ d]⇒ [b− cη j(g) < c or s− dηi(g) < d], for all
〈i j〉 6∈ g.
Proof Follows from Lemma 5, and Definition 5. uunionsq
Remark 11 Since in an SRN g under the SO-Framework, no agent benefits by delet-
ing any existing partnership, link deletion does not appear in the bilateral stability
conditions above.
Now, we look at the stability point of SVN and SRN under the SO-Framework.
The following case (Theorem 7) is the only case where the stability point depends on
the number of agents, N.
Theorem 7 In an SVN g, under the SO-Framework, ηˆ =N−1, is the unique stability
point, where N is the number of agents.
Proof Follows from Lemma 4. uunionsq
Except SVN under the SO-Framework, in all other scenarios (including the fol-
lowing), the stability point is independent of N. In all cases (including the above), the
stability point is unique. In the following, for simplicity, we assume that sd and
b
c are
integers.
Theorem 8 In an SRN g, under the SO-Framework, ηˆ = min{ sd , bc}, for all i ∈ g, is
the unique stability point, where no agent has incentive to add or delete a link.
Proof A constructive proof follows from Lemma 5.
Alternatively, it is clear that it is beneficial for each agent to add as many links as
possible. The degree of agent i in g, ηi(g), is limited only by its storage space s and
budget b. That is,
s≥ dηi(g) and b≥ cηi(g).
The theorem follows as the above is true for all i ∈ g. uunionsq
Example 2 Let us consider the networks g (see Fig. 2(a)) and s (see Fig. 2(b)), each
consisting of six agents, and network t (see Fig. 2(c)) consisting of seven agents.
Assume that, in g and t, s = 60 TB, d = 20 TB, b = 0.5, and c = 0.1. Assume that, in
network s, s = 60 TB, d = 10 TB, b = 0.4, and c = 0.1.
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(a) Network g (b) Network s (c) Network t
Fig. 2 Stable SRN Networks under the SO-Framework
Note that in networks g and t, although the budget constraints permit agents to
maintain five neighbors each, storage limitations do not permit agents to maintain
more than three neighbors each, and hence, g and t are bilaterally stable networks.
In network s, although storage constraints permit agents to maintain six neighbors
each, budget constraints do not allow agents to maintain more than four neighbors
each. Hence, s is bilaterally stable. uunionsq
We summarize the above results on bilateral stability conditions and stability
point in Table 3 and Table 4, respectively.
Table 3 Summary of stability condition for different network.
Network Type Framework Condition(s) for Bilateral Stability
SVN MO-Framework 1. For all 〈i j〉 ∈ g,
βληi(g)−1[1−λ ]< c⇒ βλη j(g)−1[1−λ ]> c, and
2. For all 〈i j〉 6∈ g,
βληi(g)[1−λ ]> c⇒ βλη j(g)[1−λ ]< c.
SV-SRN MO-Framework 1. For all 〈i j〉 ∈ g,
βληi(g)−1[1−λ ]< c⇒ βλη j(g)−1[1−λ ]> c, and
2. For all 〈i j〉 6∈ g,
βληi(g)[1−λ ]> c and s−dη j(g)≥ d
⇒ βλη j(g)[1−λ ]< c or s−dηi(g)< d.
SVN SO-Framework Each agent i ∈ g has backup partnerships with all agents j ∈ g
with j 6= i.
SRN SO-Framework For all 〈i j〉 6∈ g,
[b− cηi(g)≥ c and s−dη j(g)≥ d]
⇒ [b− cη j(g)< c or s−dηi(g)< d].
5 Stable, Efficient and Contented Networks
We first discuss conditions on N and ηˆ for connected networks to be bilaterally stable
in Section 5.1.1. We, then, look at networks that are comprised of multiple connected
components, and discuss conditions on N, ηˆ as well as number of agents in individual
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Table 4 Summary of stability point for different network types under MO- and SO-frameworks.
Network Type Framework Unique Stability Point
SVN MO-Framework ηˆ =
⌈ | ln( cβ (1−λ ) )|
| lnλ |
⌉
=
⌊ |(ln cλβ (1−λ ) )|
| lnλ |
⌋
.
SV-SRN MO-Framework n˜ = min{ηˆ , sd }
SVN SO-Framework ηˆ = N−1
SRN SO-Framework ηˆ = min{ sd , bc }
components that lead to a bilaterally stable network in Section 5.1.2. Finally, we
discuss conditions that lead to unique bilaterally stable networks in Section 5.1.3.
Henceforth, whenever we say g is a symmetric social storage network, g may be
any of the networks SVN, SRN or SV-SRN with N agents, under the MO- or SO-
Framework, with the unique stability point ηˆ corresponding to that network type and
framework.
5.1 Stable Networks
Up to this point, we have not explicitly discussed the process of network formation.
This is because all our results above are independent of any process or protocol for
network formation. However, the following results depend on the where we start the
network formation from (refer (Dai, 2015) for different network configurations). We
consider networks that evolve either from a null network (where all agents are initially
disconnected) or from a complete network (where all agents are initially connected).
When a network evolves from the null network, every agent starts contacting other
agents to form links, in no particular order. This happens until there is no pair of
agents who would consent to form a link. Similarly, when a network evolves from
the complete network, pairs of agents consider deleting links if beneficial.
5.1.1 Connected Stable Networks
We start our discussion with the following remark.
Remark 12 Each agent aims to achieve neighborhood size ηˆ .
Though agents want to achieve neighborhood size ηˆ , this may not always be
possible. The following example demonstrates how stable networks may evolve when
all agents are isolated (Fig. 3(a)) or all connected (Fig. 3(b)), initially.
Example 3 Consider networks g and s. Let ηˆ = 3. Networks g and s are both bilater-
ally stable, where g evolves from the empty network and s evolves from the complete
network. In g, although agent e has an incentive to add another link, no other agent
(who does not have a link with e) would consent to adding a new link with e as they
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(a) Network g (b) Network s
Fig. 3 Stable Networks g evolved from the Null Network, and s from the Complete Network
(that is, agents a, b, c and d) have already reached their stability point ηˆ (that is, their
neighborhood size is ηˆ = 3) and hence, have no incentive to add or delete any link.
In s, although agent f has an incentive to delete a link, no other agent (who has a
link with f ) would consent to deleting their link with f as they (that is, agents g, h, i
and j) have already reached their stability point ηˆ (that is, their neighborhood size is
ηˆ = 3) and hence, have no incentive to add or delete any link. uunionsq
In Propositions 1 and 2 below, we provide results that would be useful for an inde-
pendent observer in checking for a pairwise stable symmetric social storage network,
how many agents have maximised their utility. Thus, as discussed in the introduction,
such an observer (say, an administrator or regulator) can externally perturb the system
so that all agents achieve maximum utility.
Proposition 1 Let N and ηˆ be (positive) odd integers, with ηˆ < N. Then:
1. Any symmetric social storage network g with N agents and stability point ηˆ con-
sists of at least one agent who has an incentive to either add or delete a link.
2. There exists a connected, bilaterally stable, symmetric social storage network
with exactly N−1 agents who have no incentive to add or delete any link.
Proof Let g be bilaterally stable, and let ` be the number of links in g.
ηˆ < N ensures that ` does not exceed the maximum number of links g can possi-
bly have, that is, N×(N−1)2 .
As the utility of each agent is maximum when its neighborhood size is ηˆ , total
number of links ˜`= N×ηˆ2 will be attained if possible. However, ˜` is not an integer, as
both N and ηˆ are odd.
This implies that, not all N agents have a neighborhood size of ηˆ at stability. This
proves (1).
Now, N− 1 agents having ηˆ neighbors and the Nth agent having ηˆ − 1 or ηˆ + 1
neighbors are, however, possible. Let g be such a network with exactly N−1 agents
who have no incentive to add or delete any link. These N− 1 agents have neighbor-
hood size ηˆ . None of these N−1 agents will consent to add or delete any link (among
themselves, or with the Nth agent). Thus, the symmetric social storage network g is
bilaterally stable. If g is connected, we are done. Otherwise, all non-trivial compo-
nents (that is, components with 2 or more agents in each) of g can be connected as
follows, without changing the neighborhood sizes of any of the agents. Let 〈i1 j1〉
and 〈i2 j2〉 be links in two different (non-trivial) components, say g(κ1) and g(κ2)
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of g. Deleting both these links, and replacing them with 〈i1 j2〉 and 〈i2 j1〉 connects
g(κ1) and g(κ2), without changing the neighborhood sizes of any of the agents. As
neighborhood sizes of all the agents remain the same, the resulting graph is bilater-
ally stable too. Now, if i is an isolated agent and 〈 jk〉 is a link in g, delete 〈 jk〉, and
add 〈i j〉 and 〈ik〉 instead. In this case, clearly, i continues to be the only agent with an
incentive to either add or delete a link. This proves (2). uunionsq
Remark 13 In the proof of Proposition 1, on the one hand, when the network evolves
from the null network, ηˆ−1 neighbors for the Nth agent is as beneficial as possible,
and the total number of links will, hence, be `= [(N−1)ηˆ+(ηˆ−1)]2 .
On the other hand, when the network evolves from the complete network, ηˆ +1
neighbors for the Nth agent is as beneficial as possible, and the total number of links
will, hence, be ` = [(N−1)ηˆ+(ηˆ+1)]2 . This number also does not exceed the maximum
possible number of links, as ηˆ ≤ N−2 (because ηˆ < N, and both ηˆ and N are odd).
Proposition 2 Let at least one of N and ηˆ be even, and let ηˆ < N. Then, there exists
a connected bilaterally stable symmetric social storage network g where no agent has
incentives to add or delete any link.
Proof Existence of the ηˆ-regular network on N agents, g, follows trivially from the
Erdo˝s–Gallai theorem. Clearly g is a bilaterally stable.
5.1.2 Stable Network with Multiple Connected Components
We, now, discuss results on stability of symmetric storage networks with two or more
components. Examples of scenarios where this might be useful include companies
under the same umbrella group, where the social storage networks of each of these
companies may be viewed as a component of a larger network, which may be moni-
tored or analysed by an independent observer (as discussed in the previous section).
Claim 1 Suppose g is a symmetric social storage network with two or more compo-
nents. If g is bilaterally stable, then there is at most one component with less than or
equal to ηˆ agents.
Proof Suppose, g(κi) and g(κ j) are two different (non-empty) components with less
than or equal to ηˆ agents. It is easy to see that all agents in g(κi) as well as in g(κ j)
have less than ηˆ neighbours. Consider agents i∈ g(κi) and j ∈ g(κ j). Clearly, 〈i j〉 6∈ g
but both i and j have incentives to form (at least) one link each, implying g is not
bilaterally stable. uunionsq
Proposition 3 Let g be a symmetric social storage network which has evolved from
the null network. Let ηˆ be odd. Suppose g consists of κ connected components, κ ≥ 2.
Suppose at least two of the components, say g(κ1) and g(κ2), each have either ≤ ηˆ
agents or an odd number of agents more than ηˆ .
Then g is not bilaterally stable.
Proof Follows from Proposition 1 and Claim 1. uunionsq
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(a) Two components, g(κ1)
and g(κ2), of g
(b) Bilaterally stable network
g′
Fig. 4 Two components g(κ1) and g(κ2), though complete, are bilaterally unstable when ηˆ = 3 and form
a bilaterally stable network g′. However, the network g consisting of g(κ1) and g(κ2) as two components
is bilaterally stable when ηˆ = 2.
Example 4 Consider network g (see Fig. 4(a)), with two components g(κ1) and
g(κ2).
If ηˆ = 3, then both components of g have ηˆ agents. Every agent has an incentive
to add one more link. Thus g is bilaterally unstable. Clearly, no agent can add any
more links within the same component. The network g′ (see Fig. 4(b)) is an example
of a bilaterally stable network, which evolves from g.
Now, if ηˆ = 2, the network g is bilaterally stable. uunionsq
Corollary 3 Let g be a symmetric social storage network which has evolved from
the null network and which consists of κ components, κ ≥ 2. Let ηˆ be odd, and let
N > ηˆ . If g is bilaterally stable, then at least κ − 1 components must consist of an
even number of agents greater than ηˆ .
Remark 14 In Proposition 3 and Corollary 3, if we consider networks which have
evolved from the complete network, then Example 5 below acts as a counter example.
If ηˆ is even, we apply Proposition 2 to each component having more than ηˆ agents
to see that each of these components is bilaterally stable. Now, there can be at most
one component with ≤ ηˆ agents (refer Claim 1), and if there is such a component, g
is bilaterally stable if and only if that component is complete.
The following example shows a bilaterally stable network, which has evolved
from the complete network.
Example 5 Let N = 15 and ηˆ = 3. Consider the network g on N agents (see Fig. 5)
that consists of three components, g(κ1), g(κ2) and g(κ3). Though g consists of three
agents, a, f and k, who have an incentive to delete a link each, g is bilaterally stable.
This is because the agents, a, f and k, are in three different components, in each of
which all other agents have neighborhood size ηˆ .
Claim 2 Suppose g is a symmetric social storage network. If ηˆ = 1, and if g has
evolved from the null network, then g is bilaterally stable if and only if g consists of
a set of N−12 connected pairs of agents plus one isolated agent if N is odd, and a set
of N2 connected pairs of agents if N is even.
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(a) g(κ1) (b) g(κ2) (c) g(κ3)
Fig. 5 Stable Network g on 15 agents, consisting of 3 components g(κ1), g(κ2) and g(κ3)
Proof As g has evolved from the null network and as ηˆ = 1, no agent has two or more
neighbours. Hence, if N is even, g consists of N2 connected pairs of agents. Similarly,
if N is odd, g consists of one isolated agent and the remaining N−1 agents connect
in pairs. uunionsq
Remark 15 In Claim 2, if g has evolved from the complete network (by mutual dele-
tion of links), then networks consisting of star components are also bilaterally stable
as per Definitions 3, 4, and 5.
Remark 16 In Claim 2, if g is a given network, then in addition to the star components
as discussed in Remark 15, g may also consist of (at most) one isolated agent and
continue to be bilaterally stable.
It is interesting to note that in any star network, given that ηˆ = 1, though the
universal agent has incentive to delete a link (or links), no other (pendant) agent
will consent to deletion. However, if we start from the null network, we have the
following observation.
Claim 3 Suppose g has evolved from the null network. Then, if g is bilaterally stable,
g can never contain a star network as component.
Proof If ηˆ = 1, the result follows from Claim 2.
Suppose ηˆ > 1. If possible, let g be a star network. It is easy to see that all pendant
agents have incentives to add (at least) one more link implying that g is not bilaterally
stable, a contradiction. uunionsq
5.1.3 Unique Stable Networks
In the previous subsections, we have seen results on the existence of a bilaterally
stable social storage network. In this subsection, we look at conditions under which a
unique bilaterally stable social storage network exists. Whenever a unique bilaterally
stable network exists, the agents themselves endogenously form this network. Any
independent observer or regulator knows precisely which network would form (or
has formed).
Claim 4 If N = ηˆ+1 or ηˆ ≥ N, then there exists a unique symmetric social storage
network g that is bilaterally stable, namely the complete network on N agents.
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Proof In both cases (that is, N = ηˆ + 1 or ηˆ ≥ N), the complete network is the one
which maximises the utility of each agent. That is, no agent has an incentive to delete
any existing link and, clearly, no agent can add any more links. uunionsq
Claim 5 If N > ηˆ + 1, then there are always two or more different (with respect to
degree sequence8) bilaterally stable networks.
Proof If N = ηˆ + 2, the following stable networks are possible, which are different
with respect to degree sequence. The first, where N−1 agents form a clique and the
other agent is isolated. The second network is as follows. If ηˆ and, hence, N are even,
the connected regular network with N agents, where each agent has a neighborhood
size of ηˆ is bilaterally stable. If ηˆ and, hence, N are odd, the connected network with
N agents, where N−1 agents have a neighborhood size of ηˆ and the other agent has
a neighborhood size of ηˆ−1, is bilaterally stable. (If ηˆ and N are odd, the connected
network where N−1 agents have a neighborhood size of ηˆ and the other agent has a
neighborhood size of ηˆ+1, is a third bilaterally stable network). uunionsq
(a) n1 (b) n2 (c) n3 (d) n4
Fig. 6 Bilaterally Stable Networks with N = 6 agents, ηˆ = 3.
Example 6 Let ηˆ = 3 and N = 6. Then, there are four networks n1 (see Fig. 6(a)),
n2 (see Fig. 6(b)), n3 (see Fig. 6(c)) and n4 (see Fig. 6(d)) which are bilaterally stable.
If we look at specific protocols of network formation, then we get further unique-
ness results. For example, in Claim 2, starting from the null network (or any network
where no agent has more than 1 neighbor), the resulting bilaterally stable network is
unique up to isomorphism.
5.2 Efficient and Contented Social Storage Networks
In this subsection, we look at efficient social storage networks and contented social
storage networks. As discussed earlier, an observer who observes or monitors or reg-
ulates the network may externally perturb the system so as to reach an efficient or a
contented network.
8Two networks are different with respect to degree sequence if the sorted sequence of degrees (neigh-
borhood sizes) in one is different from that of the other. Note that, both sequences are sorted in the ascend-
ing order (or both in the descending order).
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We have seen in Section 4 that there exists a unique stability point, ηˆ , (for each
network type, under the given framework) such that, no agent gains by adding more
neighbors than ηˆ , and severing existing relationships resulting in a neighborhood size
of less than ηˆ . An efficient social storage network is, hence, one in which maximum
possible number of agents have ηˆ neighbors.
Remark 17 An efficient social storage network is bilaterally stable.
We, now, discuss an example to highlight the fact that not all stable networks are
efficient.
(a) g1 (b) g2 (c) g3
Fig. 7 Network Structure and Social Welfare
Example 7 Suppose there are six agents, a,b,c,d,e and f , in a social storage net-
work with stability point ηˆ = 3. Assume that, starting from the null network, these
agents add links (that is, build mutual data backup partnerships). Different network
structures may emerge, for example Fig. 7(a), Fig. 7(b), and Fig. 7(c)).
In network g1 (see Fig. 7(a)), agent e′s expected value of data backup is less than
that of the rest of the agents. In g2 (see Fig. 7(b)), all agents achieve the same (and
maximum) expected value of data backup, and in g3 (see Fig. 7(c)), agents a,b,c, and
d achieve higher expected value of data backup than agents e and f . g2 is efficient,
whereas g1 and g3 are not (though they are bilaterally stable).
We, now, discuss contented networks.
Remark 18 A contented social storage network is bilaterally stable.
It is easy to see that not all stable networks are contented. In Example 3, though
both g and s are stable, neither of these networks are contented. Consider g. An
independent observer could just add a storage device, p, to the network, which leads
to a contented network as explained below. This storage device acts as a dummy
agent, not trying to maximise its utility, and always agreeing to add or delete any link
with any agent. Hence, for contented networks, we do not consider any dummy agent
as a part of the network. In g, agent e has not achieved the maximum possible utility
(as ηˆ = 3, but e has 2 neighbors) while all other agents have. By allowing e to store
a copy of its data on storage device p, e also obtains the maximum possible utility.
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This network is, now, a contented network (where the utility of the dummy agent p
is not considered). This is, in fact, a hybrid model — hybrid between a centralised
storage system and a decentralised one.
Next, we relate contented networks and efficient networks.
Proposition 4 Let g be a symmetric social storage network with N agents and sta-
bility point ηˆ . Then:
1. If at least one of N and ηˆ is/ are even, then, g is efficient if and only if g is
contented.
2. Suppose N and ηˆ are odd. Then, an efficient network does exist but there does not
exist any contented network.
Proof 1 follows from Proposition 2, since, if at least one of N and ηˆ is/ are even,
then, g is efficient if and only if g is ηˆ-regular.
2 follows from Proposition 1. uunionsq
Remark 19 Not all efficient networks are contented.
In Example 3, neither g nor s are contented. However, (at least) one of them is ef-
ficient. The following Propositions help identify which of them is/ are efficient, under
the MO- as well as SO-Frameworks, for SVN, SRN and SV-SRN networks, as the
case may be (Refer Table 2). Note that any stable network in which maximum possi-
ble number of agents have ηˆ neighbors is not necessarily efficient, as per Definitions
6, 7, and 8.
Proposition 5 Let g be an SVN or SV-SRN under the MO-Framework, with N agents
and stability point ηˆ . Suppose both N and ηˆ are odd. Then g is efficient if and only if
g has N−1 agents with neighborhood size ηˆ and one of the following holds:
1. c< βλ
ηˆ
2 (
1
λ −λ ) and g has one agent with neighborhood size ηˆ+1.
2. c> βλ
ηˆ
2 (
1
λ −λ ) and g has one agent with neighborhood size ηˆ−1.
3. c = βλ
ηˆ
2 (
1
λ − λ ) and g has one agent with neighborhood size either ηˆ + 1 or
ηˆ−1.
Proof For each i ∈ A, its utility is ui(g) = βi(1−ληi(g))− cηi(g). (Refer Equation
2). As the network is SVN or SV-SRN, βi = β , for all i.
max
ηi(g)
ui(g) = max
ηi(g)
(β (1−ληi(g))− cηi(g)) = β (1−λ ηˆ)− cηˆ
Let g1 be the network where N−1 agents have ηˆ neighbors and the other agent
has ηˆ−1 neighbors. Let g2 be the network where N−1 agents have ηˆ neighbors and
the other agent has ηˆ+1 neighbors.
ui(g1) = β (1−λ (ηˆ−1))− c(ηˆ−1) and ui(g2) = β (1−λ (ηˆ+1))− c(ηˆ+1).
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From Proposition 1 and Definition 6, it is easy to see that either g1 or g2 (or both)
is (are) efficient. That is, max(∑
i
ui(g)) is either ui(g1) or ui(g2). If ui(g1) < ui(g2),
we get result 1, if ui(g1)> ui(g2), we get result 2 and if ui(g1) = ui(g2), both g1 and
g2 are efficient, leading to result 3. uunionsq
Proposition 6 An SVN under the SO-Framework is efficient if and only if it is a
complete network.
Proof Follows from Theorem 7. uunionsq
Proposition 7 For an SRN under the SO-Framework, s/d and b/c act as constraints
for the maximum number of links possible.
Let g be an SRN under the SO-Framework, with N agents and stability point ηˆ .
Then:
1. If at least one of N and ηˆ is/ are even, then g is efficient if and only if g is ηˆ-
regular.
2. If both N and ηˆ are odd, then g is efficient if and only if g has N−1 agents with
ηˆ neighbors and the other agent with ηˆ−1 neighbors.
Proof From Theorem 8, ηˆ = min{ sd , bc}.
As the budget b and the storage space available s act as constraints, no agent can
have more than ηˆ neighbors. Therefore, part 1 follows from Proposition 1. (We do
not have the possibility of one agent having ηˆ+1 neighbors as we had in Proposition
5).
Part 2 follows from Proposition 2. uunionsq
6 Related Work
As briefly mentioned in the introduction, our work is most closely related to P2P
systems. Especially, our strategic network formation game has some similarities with
peer selection for data placement (Rzadca et al, 2010, 2015; Toka and Michiardi,
2011) and topology formation (Moscibroda et al, 2006, 2011) in P2P systems. To start
off, in P2P nomenclature, virtual (i.e., logical) topologies (or structures) are built by
peers (in-general computers or software modules) on top of physical networks (e.g.,
Internet).
Rzadca et al (2010, 2015) have studied data placement in a strategic interaction
between peers to maximise data availability. Here, peers are involved in a reciprocal
replication contract (a pair of agents replicates each others’ data to increase data
availability). They show that agents prefer to form contracts with only those who have
similar availability. This behaviour of peers makes the system inefficient. However,
by setting cooperation rules and providing incentives to peers, data availability can
be increased along with the increase in the efficiency of the system. We can take
inspiration from these ideas of cooperation rules and incentives to design a more
practical social storage system.
32 P. Mane, K. Ahuja, N. Krishnamurthy
Toka and Michiardi (2011) studied data placement in a different strategic setting
than above. Here, peers selfishly select partners based upon their profiles. The pro-
file of each peer, which includes the online availability, the bandwidth, and global
preferences, is considered along with the utility function so that the data storing costs
are minimised. Authors have shown here that there exists at least one pairwise stable
matching and it can be found in polynomial time. In our study, we do not consider
agents availability. This is based upon the assumption that the out of band communi-
cation (Li and Dabek, 2006) is possible between them. However, this can be further
analysed.
Finally, we look at topology formation in P2P systems. P2P topologies are a mir-
ror image of social connections in our case. Moscibroda et al (2006, 2011) have
proposed a locality game (inspired by the network creation game proposed by Fab-
rikant et al (2003)) to study the impact of selfish peers on P2P topologies. In this
setting, selfish peers select their partners in such way that the stretch (i.e., the look up
performance in terms of latencies) could be minimised. Their three main results are
as follows: the topologies build by selfish agents are worse compared to the topolo-
gies build by agents in collaboration; the topologies constructed by selfish agents are
never stable (i.e., there is always a change in the topology); and determining a pure
Nash equilibrium is NP-complete here. This aspect of selfish agents is part of our
future work and is discussed in detail in the next section. However, as motivated in
the introduction and in the background sections, for us the solution concept of Nash
equilibrium is not useful and we use bilateral stability instead.
When looking at P2P systems more closer to our social storage systems, P2P so-
cial networking is one such area (Buchegger et al, 2009; Buchegger and Datta, 2009).
Topology formation is one of the concerns here (Buchegger and Datta, 2009). We be-
lieve that our solution concept of bilateral stability has its theoretical consequences
in determining which bilaterally stable topology emerges in P2P social networking.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have expanded on two untouched aspects of social storage systems,
namely, endogenous network formation and bilateral stability of such networks. We
have formalised social storage networks as a network formation game where each
agent tries to maximise its utility. We considered two frameworks for utility of agents
in the network. We modified the pairwise stability definition of Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996) to include mutual consent for link deletion too (as required for social storage
networks), and also to include storage and budget constraints.
After defining bilateral stability as a modification of pairwise stability, we anal-
ysed bilateral stability of symmetric social storage networks. Our stability analysis
involved restudying conditions of stability under the new definition of pairwise sta-
bility (that is, bilateral stability), derivation of a unique stability point (which is a
neighborhood size where no agent has any incentive to add or delete a link), and
some necessary and sufficient conditions for symmetric social storage networks to be
bilaterally stable. We also showed that ideally all agents in a network want to achieve
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their stability point but a network can be bilaterally stable even when this stability
point is not reached for one agent.
Further, we discussed which bilaterally stable networks would evolve. We also
discuss why just studying stability is not enough and one has to look at efficiency
and contentment of the network. Efficiency is the case when the sum of utilities of all
agents is maximised, and contentment is when the individual utility of every agent is
maximised. We relate these three properties of the network with one another. We also
give conditions on the number of agents and stability point (besides other constraints)
to achieve bilaterally stable, efficient, and contented networks.
Next, we discuss some future directions. We first discuss model specific future
work and then solution concept specific. We assumed that the cost to maintain a link
is shared equally among the agents on either side of the link. Looking at asymmetric
cost sharing, for example centrally-sponsored star networks, is one of the direction
for future work.
For the MO-framework, we use a convex combination of our two objective func-
tions (maximizing data reliability and minimizing the total cost of the link), and this
is no longer a case of Multi-Objective (MO) optimization. Since the solution of the
convexly combined problem may not always be the solution of the original MO prob-
lem, we plan to look at finding a Pareto frontier as part of future work (path followed
by most MO algorithms).
In our current work, we have not focused on the heterogeneous behavior of agents
in social storage settings. Although incorporating complex and heterogeneous behav-
ior of agents into the model is closer to real world scenarios, this would make it
difficult to deal with the model and as well as predict its outcome. Kuznetsov and
Schmid (2010) propose a social range matrix, which is a novel approach to deal with
heterogeneous behavior of agents in the network. In particular, social range matrices
capture three scenarios: anarchy, monarchy and coalitions. In anarchy, each agent is
selfish. In monarchy, agents only care about one agent in the network. In the coali-
tions scenario, agents support each other within the same coalition but act selfishly or
maliciously towards agents in other coalitions. In this work, they propose a network
creation game for capturing the effect of the social range matrix, and further explore
how this matrix affects equilibria in a network game. Investigating the applicability
of the social range matrix for the frameworks 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 and bilateral stability is
part of our future work.
In all our discussions, we have assumed that any pair of agents can potentially
form a link. In scenarios where agents do not necessarily trust all agents in the net-
work, our results on bilateral stability extend to every clique (of mutually trusting
agents) in the network. If not all agents trust each other, we may use an extension
of the Hall’s marriage theorem (Hall, 1935) to aid independent observers determine
whether it is possible to form an efficient network or not.
Coming to the solution concept, if we had used the concept of Pairwise Nash
Stability as defined by Goyal and Joshi (2006b) and had applied the mutual consent
requirement for deletion too, we would have the same results we have obtained in
this paper. This is because the mutual consent requirement for addition and deletion
overrides the requirement for Nash equilibrium. We are currently working on mod-
ifying the definition of Pairwise Nash Stability to multiple other scenarios. Looking
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at strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria (Dutta and Mutuswami, 1997), strong
pairwise stability (Jackson and van den Nouweland, 2005), and farsighted equilib-
rium (Dutta et al, 2005), are also future research directions.
In this paper, we have discussed about network efficiencies but not looked at its
contrapositive. That is, the inefficiencies in the network. The price of anarchy is an
interesting measure to analyse the extent to which a network is inefficient (Papadim-
itriou, 2001; Demaine et al, 2012). By definition, this means ratio of the worst sum
of the utilities of agents in an equilibrium network to the best sum of the utilities. In
this paper, we have bilaterally stable networks in place of equilibrium networks. In
our case, efficient networks are the ones with the best sum of utilities. We also plan
to analyze stability and efficiency of social storage networks by considering pairwise
stability as the solution concept, thereby dropping the requirement of mutual consent
for deletion.
Our utility function depends on the cost incurred by an agent to maintain a link,
the worth (value) of data, the disk failure rate, and the neighborhood size of an agent.
Out of these, the first three are constants (same for all agents) while the neighborhood
size varies. In our case, we can find the best sum of utility (using Proposition 7).
However, knowing the worst sum of utility is non-trivial. The neighborhood size of
every agent that would give us the worse sum of utility is challenging.
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